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TAXATION AND WATER POLLUTION CONTROLt
TERRY A. FERRARtt and ANDREW WHINSTONttt

In this article we wish to discuss the problem of water quality
management. We will examine one of the most strongly advocated
methods of administrative control which is suggestively termed
"effluent charge" water resource management and carefully discuss
the attributes and shortcomings of this technique. Having given due
consideration to this well publicized method, we will proceed to
describe an alternative water quality management approach and argue
for its superiority. In particular, we will discuss a reasonable economic situation where the effluent charge technique breaks down
and the method herein described operates efficiently. Moreover, we
will argue that this is likely to be the situation found in regions
experiencing acute water quality problems.
DETERMINING WATER QUALITY STANDARDS
Let us suppose that as the result of public pressure to "save our
water" the region's governing structure assumes the responsibility of
water quality control.' In an attempt to insulate the control of the
region's water resource from the pressures of party politics the
governing body sets up a Water Control Board (W.C.B.). This W.C.B.
will have the legislative and judicial responsibility of specifying a
standard for water quality and enforcing this standard in the region's
watercourses.
The W.C.B. will immediately recognize that there is no universally
accepted measure of water quality. In the study of water quality
tThis research was partially supported by a Public Health Service grant #1 F03
AP48007-01, from the National Air Pollution Control administration; and by the Office of
Water Resources Research under contract #14-31-0001-3080. The opinions presented are
the responsibility of the authors.
t'tAssistant Professor of Economics, Pennsylvania State University; Research Associate to
the Center for Air Environment Studies.
tt t Professor of Economics and Management, Purdue University.
1. For generality of exposition we need not refer to the relevant governing structure as
federal, state or one of the various forms of local government; but it is one of these to which
we are referring.
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problems one discovers talk of "suspended solids," "BOD," and
"pesticide residues," as well as other types of water quality measures.
But the W.C.B. has the mandate, presented to it fundamentally by
the region's population, to "do something about the region's water
quality." So let us suppose as a first approximation the W.C.B. decides on a quality measure or a combination of measures to serve as a
"yardstick" for its operation.
The second order of legislative business to be conducted by the
W.C.B. must be to determine the required level of water purity in the
various watercourses of the community. Through consultation with
hydrologists the commission members must determine the assimilative capacity in the various reaches of the involved streams and
through demographic studies of the concerned public they must
determine the effect on the population of alternative levels of water
purity. With this information gathered the W.C.B. must make the
unenviable reach-by-reach, stream-by-stream specification of the
required level of water quality. The final legislative act of the W.C.B.
will consist of a public policy announcement of the required water
quality profiles in the region's water-courses.
At this point the W.C.B. may justly feel that it has come a long
way in the struggle for water quality control. The remaining task
faced by the W.C.B. is that of enforcement of the now enunciated
water quality standards. To this we turn in the following sections
where we examine alternative approaches to the administrative problem. Both of these managerial techniques take as the goal of the
W.C.B. the satisfaction of these water quality profiles at minimum
total direct cost. In this sense, the W.C.B. desires to induce pollution
abatement activity to the required level in a manner that minimizes
the sum of the individual abatement costs.
EFFLUENT CHARGE SCHEMES
By far the most famous administrative technique to induce pollution abatement activities is that of effluent related taxation schemes.
A leading proponent of this technique is Allen Kneese [Il] who
argues for the efficiency and minimal information demands of such
methods. 2
The argument is frequently made that the use of watercourses to
dispose of waste material is a good that is being used up by polluters
and should be priced as any other good. The price is called the
"effluent charge." Setting water quality standards in effect fixes the
amount of watercourse disposal capacity for sale, and the equilib2. Hass, Optimal Taxing for the Abatement of Water Pollution, 6 Water Resources Re-

search (1970).
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rium effluent charge is defined such that the demand for watercourse disposal capacity is equal to this fixed supply.
There are several pleasant features about this technique. First, it
satisfies our criterion of minimum total abatement cost while maintaining the specified water quality profiles. Since each polluter
decides for himself by how much, if at all, he should reduce his
wastes, the burden of pollution control is thus shared in exactly the
right way. That is, since every polluter adjusts to the charges in
whatever way minimizes his cost, the social cost of achieving the
target amount of waste discharge-which is the sum of the costs
borne by all polluters-will also be minimized. 3 In economic terms
each polluter equates his marginal cost of pollution control to the
prevailing effluent charge which is just large enough to induce the
required abatement activity.
Second, since the effluent charges are actually collected from
those who do pollute the W.C.B. is supplied with an economic rent
on the region's natural watercourse disposal capacity. This revenue
factor is understandably attractive to those familiar with government
financial problems.
Third, it is relatively easy to operate. By measurement of waste
outfalls the correct individual tax payment is assessable.
Fourth, the effluent charges give the correct incentives to the
polluters. A polluter may reduce his costs by discovering alternate
products, processes or abatement techniques.
We now turn our discussion of effluent charge administrative
schemes to those features of the method which are of the undesirable
nature. The most detrimental objection we would like to raise to this
type approach to water quality management concerns its fundamentally static applicability. In a nondynamic, nongrowth oriented
region it is reasonable to assume that some semblance of an equilibrium effluent charge rate could eventually be established to provide
the required inducement for abatement in the region. However, as is
surely apparent to the reader, our most acute water quality problems
occur in the most vigorously developing metropolitan regions of our
country. In this more dynamic setting the concept of a static equilibrium effluent charge is meaningless. Moreover, to expect the W.C.B.
to maintain a dynamic equilibrium in response to changing watercourse disposal demand is clearly unreasonable. The problem is the
advocates of effluent charge water quality management are trying to
superimpose a technique that has validity in a static situation on a
highly dynamic phenomenon.
Another problem intrinsic to the effluent charge schemes is the
3. J. Dales, Optimal Taxing for the Abatement of Water Pollution (1968).
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indiscriminate nature of any imposed tax scheme. With an ordinary
good there is no justification for refusing to pay a price. But the case
of watercourse waste disposal activity is somewhat different since
originally this waste discharge acti- ity was not priced. The good was
available and served as an inducement for industries to locate.
Implicitly a right was given to use whatever environmental waste
disposal capacity that was available. With effluent charges there is no
cognizance of these prior rights.
ALLOCATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
We propose an approach to the administrative problem faced by
the W.C.B. that is superior to the effluent charge techniques, whose
properties were discussed above. We believe that all the desirable
properties of the effluent charge method are carried over while the
disturbing features of that method are omitted by our managerial
scheme.
Within the effluent charge framework the allocation of the available waste disposal capacity in the region is handled implicitly via a
taxation inducement on the behavior of the polluters. We argue that
it is the concealment of the basic availability of disposal capacity
that produces the failure of this technique in a dynamic situation.
Moreover, we will discuss the direct allocation of watercourse disposal capacity to the polluters and demonstrate that the dynamic
failure so apparent in the effluent charge schemes is resolved via this
approach.
Let us assume that through consultation with hydrologists the
W.C.B. members may determine the effect from each major waste
outfall on the various reaches of the stream. That is, the W.C.B. may
determine the effect of any given waste discharge on all downstream
reaches in terms of the accepted water quality measure. Now the
W.C.B. may correctly view the determined water purity standards as
a lower bound on the region's water quality. Therefore, with the use
of the assumed diffusion relations the W.C.B. may conveniently
convert these lower bound purity standards to upper limits on waste
outfall levels. With this conversion we may appropriately discuss the
responsibility of the W.C.B. as:
The allocation to the community's polluters of the available or legal
watercourse rights for waste disposal according to the cost minimization criterion.
It is in this sense that our administrative technique involves the
direct allocation of environmental property rights or user permits
among the potential polluters of the watercourse. Moreover, since
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the supply of such user permits is fixed by the determined water
quality standards any allocation mechanism consistent with this
supply will never permit the violation of these standards. As such we
will observe that the dynamic allocation technique to be described
will maintain these water purity specifications.
THE ALLOCATION MECHANISM
The method herein described involves an incentive-feedback
algorithm that iteratively allocates the available environmental resources among the polluters in accordance with the cost minimization criterion of the W.C.B. Starting from an initial division of the
available environmental disposal capacity among the polluters of the
community, each iterative reallocation more closely approximates
the optimal apportionment under the given criterion. Let us suggest
that dividing the available environmental resource among the polluters of the community in proportion to the historical allocation
would serve as a suitable starting point for our algorithm; this will
give some recognition to the existing industry structure and help
alleviate the hrbitrary nature that was discussed previously as an
intrinsic part of the effluent charge schemes.
The question then is how to reallocate these available environmental property rights among the polluters in a manner consistent
with the W.C.B.'s goal function. Now for each apportionment among
the polluters we will show that each polluter can evaluate the effect
on the W.C.B.'s cost criterion of obtaining a slightly larger water
resource property right allocation. The polluter that indicates that it
can achieve the greatest positive effect on the W.C.B.'s criterion value
for a unit increase in property right allocation is favored in the
succeeding allocation by the W.C.B.
We are effectively describing a bidding operation for property
rights between the polluters and the W.C.B. Thus, this iterative
procedure successively reapportions the total available property right
allotment for waste disposal among the high bidders of the community. Moreover, this bidding operation results (as would be
anticipated) in prices for exchange in this property right market. In
this light, the initial or historically derived allocation is successively
adapted to the optimal allocation as implied by the W.C.B.'s cost
criterion, but at no time in the adaptation process are the environmental quality standards violated-the total available supply is fixed.
In the following section we will develop precisely the bidding
system alluded to here, and we will carefully consider the role of the
W.C.B. in guiding the system to the optimal allocation.
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DISCUSSION OF THE ALLOCATION MECHANISM
We must first examine the assertion that each polluter is capable
of evaluating the effect on the W.C.B.'s allocation criterion associated with his obtaining a slightly larger water resource use right
allotment.
In this area consider the effect on the polluter of a marginal increase in his water use permit allotment. This increased supply of
waste disposal resource will permit a reduction in the scale of his
waste treatment effort. That is, associated with a marginal increase in
environmental property right allotment the polluter will experience a
marginal cost reduction in his pollution control activity. We now
recall that the W.C.B.'s optimality criterion consists of the summed
pollution control cost outlays of all the polluters, and it now
becomes apparent that each polluter can evaluate the marginal effect
on the W.C.B.'s criterion associated with a marginal increase in his
water resource allotment. That is, the marginal cost reduction in each
polluter's waste treatment activity associated with a marginal increase in water resource property right allotment is precisely the
marginal effect on the W.C.B.'s criterion associated with such an
allocation change.
With this capability of the polluters established let us observe one
difficulty in the allocation method alluded to above. Even with the
reasonable assumption that the local waste treatment projects all
exhibit decreasing returns to scale it is still unclear what we mean by
"favored in the succeeding allocation." Since the marginal cost
exhibited by each polluter is related to his present water resource
allotment the appropriate degree of "favoring" to take place is
unspecifiable. It is this snag in the above reasoning that demands the
construction of an iterative process by which the W.C.B. may
become "sensitized" to the various waste treatment cost functions.
In particular, the two-way information transfer which will constitute
an iteration of our algorithm will successively permit the W.C.B. to
"learn" the necessary cost characteristics associated with each polluter. We will now begin the description of the algorithm in a manner
by which this learning process will become apparent.
Starting from any initial allocation of the available property rights
the W.C.B. will request the following information from the region's
polluters:
1. The marginal cost of waste treatment associated with the
present scale of operation.
2. The total cost of the waste treatment activity presently undertaken.
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Maintaining our supposition that the waste treatment projects
exhibit decreasing returns to scale we may portray the W.C.B.'s "cost
curve learning process" as in Figure 1. In this figure the dotted cost
curve is unknown to the W.C.B,'s commissioners, but the tangential
portions may be constructed from the information obtained during
each iteration of the algorithm. This construction follows directly
from the fact that the slope of the waste treatment cost curve is
precisely the marginal cost of waste treatment which in turn is associated with the allocated level of user permits to the polluter. In this
manner the W.C.B. may successively (iteratively) investigate the
waste treatment cost considerations of the various polluters.
We now assert that by careful consideration of such piecewiselinear approximations to the polluters' cost curves the W.C.B. may
4
iteratively approach the region-wide cost minimizing allocation. In
Figure 1.
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4. For a detailed proof of this result see T. Ferrar and A. Whinston, Environmental
Resource Allocation (1971) (an unpublished manuscript, where the tools of optimization
theory are exploited to analyze this technique).
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particular while recognizing the fixed supply of property rights in the
region, the W.C.B. in each time period must determine a desirable
allocation (i.e. the W.C.B. must reshuffle the supply of user permits
among the polluters); this allocation will induce a polluter response
(information sets 1. and 2.) which will serve to increase the degree of
understanding of each polluter's cost structure. This improved understanding will serve to permit an improved reallocation in the following period. Hence, we will observe a dynamic convergence to a cost
minimizing allocation of the property rights available under the
previously specified water quality standards.
We have described a communication based algorithm by which the
W.C.B. may infer sufficient information to guide the system to an
optimal allocation of the available property rights. We may portray
the communication linkage for this dynamic (iterative) allocation
method as in Figure 2.
Figure 2.

total and marginal
cost of waste treatment
associated with this
level of property right
allotment

Portrayal of the communication linkage in a
typical iteration of the allocation algorithm.
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COMPARISONS

Let us re-examine the two allocation methods discussed in this
work with the hope of establishing a fundamental distinguished
feature. This can best be done by examining the repercussions
created by the entrance in the region of a new potential polluter.
If this form of economic growth was to occur in a region whose
water purity were protected by an effluent charge type scheme we
would likely observe the following chronological pattern:
a. The new polluter, observing the existing effluent charge, would
begin disposing at his optimal rate into the watercourse.
b. This added waste load on the stream would deteriorate the
water quality below the previously specified standard.
c. This watercourse deterioration would signal the W.C.B. that a
change in the equilibrium level of the effluent charge had
occurred.
d. The W.C.B. would increase the effluent charge to the point that
would restore the desired water purity.
Turning now to the analogous chronological account that we
would observe in a region whose water purity was protected by a
property right allocation scheme, we would have:
a. Since any waste discharge must be preceded by the granting of
waste disposal property rights, the new potential polluter
would take the initiative and request to enter the bid-allotment
process operated by the W.C.B.
b. Through the described bid-response mechanism the W.C.B.
would reallocate the available water use permits among the
polluters of the region.
c. After obtaining his allotment of property rights the new polluter may begin operation.
Since a given set of water quality standards imply a maximum
effluent discharge profile in the watercourse, the entrance of a new
polluter will result, via either scheme, in an adjustment of the outfall
profile in the region. However, the fundamental distinguishing feature is the temporal relation of this outfall profile adjustment and
the initial waste discharge by the new polluter. In the effluent charge
scheme the waste dumping and water quality deterioration preceded
any action by the W.C.B.; however, in the property right constrained
scheme the W.C.B.'s reshuffling of available rights preceded any new
waste discharge activity.
It is apparent that the property right allocation scheme places the
burden of adjustment on the new potential polluter whereas the
effluent charge scheme sacrifices the environmental quality during
the adjustment period. Moreover, in a dynamic expanding commun-
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ity it is not unreasonable to anticipate the existence of a perpetual
adjustment lag which under the effluent charge scheme would imply
the perpetual violation of the water quality standards.

CONCLUSION
By placing some economic interpretations on the above formulation, we may manifest the desire of polluters to encourage the
optimal allocation of the available environmental property rights by
the W.C.B. Let us, as the W.C.B., inform the polluters that they may
alter their allotment by bidding on a per unit property right basis for
additional rights. However, as part of the rules of the game the
polluter will be required to pay this per unit charge on every unit of
property right allocation to him in the following period. The bid we
would receive from each polluter would be equal to the marginal cost
of waste treatment necessitated by the present property right allotment-that is, the highest price they can justify paying.s But, this is
precisely the information required by our algorithm; hence, this
bidding framework is a reasonable manner of eliciting thy necessary
information from the polluters. Moreover, since suboptimal allocations will necessarily result in some polluters' being subjected to an
excess demand or supply of property rights at the prevailing price,
we will have a concerted effort to encourage the bidding-reallocation
process. All polluters will be at equilibrium (in the sense that excess
demand is zero) only when the allocation by the W.C.B. is optimal.
Notice also by charging the polluters according to the above bidallotment process the W.C.B. will obtain revenue support for its
operation. Hence, by instituting the above modification of the property right allocation scheme we are able to recoup one of the more
attractive features of the effluent charge techniques.
We would like to make one final observation concerning the relative merits of the Dales' market allocation framework and the one
presented here. In light of the burden associated with suboptimal
allocations, as discussed above, considerations as to the speed of
adjustment seem of central importance when considering the relative
merits of alternative systems. The Walrasian adjustment mechanism
suggested by Dales can best be characterized as a marginal price
adjusting system whose speed of adjustment depends critically on the
efficiency of information transfer within the market; however, the
complexity of the information involved in such a property rights
5. Implicit in this discussion is some assumption about the bidding behavior of the
polluters, and we are ignoring the possibility of gaming (false bidding).
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market, involving technical as well as sociological problems, would
tend to inhibit the effective communication among the participants.
In particular, it is felt that the information demanded by our
mechanism, though slightly greater, is more easily obtainable due to
the more centralized coordination and permits a relatively aggressive
approach to the optimal allocation.

